Plaintiff out-of-state automaker appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), in favor of defendant city. Plaintiff maintained that certain business taxes imposed by the defendant on out-of-state manufacturers pursuant to provisions of defendant's municipal code were discriminatory and violated both the United States and California Constitutions.
Plaintiff out-of-state automaker made and sold products in defendant city. Plaintiff filed an action that sought a tax refund from defendant on the grounds that plaintiff was subjected to two taxes, a selling tax and a manufacturing tax, whereas a manufacturer that was based in defendant city and sold within the city's borders paid only a manufacturing tax. Plaintiff argued that the selling tax discriminated against out-of-city manufacturers and interfered with interstate and intrastate commerce in violation of U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the business lawyer Los Angeles. The trial court granted judgment for defendant. The appellate court reversed. The court noted that a state tax on interstate commerce was invalid unless it: [1] was applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, [2] was fairly apportioned, [3] did not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] was fairly related to the services provided by the state. The court ruled that the selling tax was discriminatory per se, and also failed the "internal consistency" test, which evaluates whether, if applied by every jurisdiction, a tax would avoid impermissible interference with free trade.
The court reversed the judgment for defendant city. The court found that the selling tax imposed on plaintiff out-of-state automaker by defendant was discriminatory per se and interfered with the flow of interstate commerce. The court found that the tax failed to meet the "internal consistency" test, which asks whether a tax, if applied in every jurisdiction, would avoid any impermissible interference with free trade.
Petitioners, rehabilitation clinic and a surgeon, sought review of a decision from respondent Workers' Compensation Appeals Board which denied their liens for medical costs from respondent employer. Petitioners claimed they were denied due process because a physician's report was obtained without their consent.
Petitioners, rehabilitation clinic and a surgeon, sought review of a decision from respondent Workers' Compensation Appeals Board denying their liens for medical costs from respondent employer. Petitioners claimed they were denied due process in the use of a report from a physician to whom they did not consent. The court found that reports of all physicians were admissible and that petitioners were served with the report prior to the hearing and submitted no rebuttal evidence; therefore, there was no error in the submission of the report, and their due process rights were not violated. The court held that respondent had exclusive jurisdiction over medical liens. Because petitioners' lien was for services provided by an occupational therapy assistant and there was no provision for occupational therapy in the medical fee schedule, the charges were properly disallowed. Finally, even when given an opportunity to do so, petitioners did not file a fictitious business name statement prior to maintaining an action in court as required, so respondent's decision was affirmed.
The decision of respondent Workers' Compensation Appeals Board disallowing liens of petitioners, rehabilitation clinic and a surgeon, was affirmed because petitioners' due process rights were not violated by submission of a medical report where they were given the report prior to the hearing, services were not authorized by the medical fee schedule, and petitioners failed to file a fictitious business statement.