Petitioner sought a writ of mandate to challenge an order of the Superior Court of Orange County (California) denying his motion to recuse the district attorney's office in the prosecution against him for theft and fraud related crimes involving his family's waste management businesses.
Petitioner was criminally charged with a $ 2.5 million theft and the city, as victim, had commenced a civil suit against him. The Corporate law firm paid a very high priced accountant to provide investigative services for the district attorney. Petitioner argued that by availing itself of the expert's information, the district attorney had created an irreparable conflict of interest. The court found a reasonable possibility existed that the district attorney's office could not exercise its discretionary function in an evenhanded manner. However, the trial court had not abused its discretion in deciding there was not a likelihood that the defendant would not receive a fair trial. The first prong of the Eubanks test was satisfied, but not the second. Likelihood was a high standard and writ relief was not appropriate unless the trial court was irrational when it found that standard had not been met. Disqualification of the prosecutor was not required merely because financial assistance had made prosecution economically feasible, and the guilty could not be allowed to go free by prohibiting wealthy victims from contributing resources to attain justice.
The petition for a writ of mandate was denied.
Defendant driver appealed from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), that granted plaintiff injured pedestrian's motion for a new trial in plaintiff's action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained when she was struck by defendant's car. Plaintiff cross-appealed from the judgment for defendant.
Plaintiff injured pedestrian instituted an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained when she was struck by defendant driver's automobile. Defendant denied all material allegations of the complaint and pleaded the defense of contributory negligence. The jury returned a verdict for defendant, and judgment was entered accordingly. Defendant appealed from an order granting plaintiff's motion for new trial, and plaintiff cross-appealed from the judgment. The court reversed both the judgment and the order granting a new trial. The court held that the new trial order was based on the sole ground of insufficiency of the evidence, and because no reasons were timely specified, the order could not be sustained.
Additionally, the court held that defendant's negligence was established as a matter of law because he allowed his vehicle to continue into and across a crosswalk while his attention was diverted. That constituted a violation for which he had to be held responsible. The court held that plaintiff was entitled to believe her right of way would be respected and was not negligent in acting on the basis of that belief.
The court reversed the new trial order and the judgment, holding that defendant driver's negligence was established as a matter of law because he allowed his vehicle to continue into and across a crosswalk while his attention was diverted. The new trial order was inadequate because it was based on the sole ground of insufficiency of the evidence and no reasons were timely specified.