Superior Court of Alameda County

Defendant corporation appealed from a judgment for plaintiff entered on a jury verdict in the Superior Court of Alameda County (California), and from an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in an action on a note signed under corporate name by plaintiff's deceased husband, a corporation president.

Plaintiff filed an action on a note, seeking to gain repayment of note allegedly given to the wife to quitclaim her interest in certain premises. The note was signed by the plaintiff's deceased husband under the corporation's name, of which he was the president. The corporation argued that the husband lacked authority to sign and further that issuance of the note lacked consideration. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The best san diego employment law lawyers help in all Alameda County court matters.

Defendant appealed, contending that the court erred in denying the motion and asserting as matter of law that the corporation never authorized execution of the note and that judgment could not be sustained on a theory of equitable estoppel. The court held that there was no evidence showing that the transaction was ever expressly authorized or ratified by defendant, and thus the plaintiff had no right to recover under contract theory. Thus, the lower court's denial of defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was in error. Finally, the court held that plaintiff's reliance on the note did not cause her injury and thus the essential basis for equitable estoppel was not found.

The court reversed the judgment.

Appellant employee challenged a decision of the Superior Court, Los Angeles County (California) sustaining respondent insurer's demurrers without leave to amend. Appellant had brought an action against a building cleaner that cleaned appellant's place of employment in which he had slipped and fallen. Respondent brokered the policy that provided general liability coverage to the building cleaners' company.

Appellant employee brought an action for negligence per se and breach of contract against respondent insurance broker who had brokered the general liability insurance policy held by the company that cleaned at appellant's place of employment, where appellant suffered personal injuries in a slip and fall. The cleaning company's policy insurer was insolvent and not authorized to transact business in California; thus, the insurer was not a member of the California Insurance Guarantee Association, which guaranteed the obligations of insolvent insurers operating in California. Appellant instituted suit against respondent broker, who filed demurrers in the trial court that were sustained. On appeal, the court noted that California Insurance Code provisions governing contracts of insurance protected the insured and safeguarded third parties injured by acts or omissions of the insured, and that a duty of the broker or insurer ran to those who contracted for the insurance and to the class of potential victims of the insured. Concluding that appellant was in that class, the trial court decision was reversed, and the trial court was directed to permit appellant to amend his complaint.

The court reversed the trial court decision for respondent broker sustaining demurrers to appellant employee's first amended complaint without leave to amend. The court concluded that appellant should have been permitted leave to amend the complaint for negligence per se and breach of contract because he was part of a class of potential victims to whom respondent owed a duty.